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Abstract
This thesis studies the optimal copyright protection level for a single rm. We consider
two market settings: monopoly and duopoly under Cournot competition. We also analyze the
optimal level in Cournot setting in two subsections: with and without a cost of implementing
protection. The optimal level for the monopolist without any potential competitors is full
protection. Under competition, for su¢ ciently high xed cost values, the monopolist rm
chooses a level which is below the monopoly setting. We also show that with implementation
costs, competition is stronger.
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Özet
Bu tezde tek bir rma için optimal "telif hakk¬koruma" seviyesi çal¬¸s¬lm¬¸st¬r. ·Iki farkl¬
piyasa modeli ele al¬nm¬¸st¬r: Tekelci piyasa ve 2 rmal¬(düopol) Cournot rekabet modeli.
Cournot rekabet modeli de kendi içinde 2 ayr¬bas¸l¬kta incelenmi¸stir: Koruma uygulamas¬n¬n
maliyetli ve maliyetsiz olus¸u. Potansiyel bir rakibin olmad¬¼g¬tekel için optimal seviye tam ko-
ruma iken rekabet ortam¬nda ve yeterince yüksek sabit maliyet de¼gerleri için tekelci piyasa
seviyesinin alt¬nda bir koruma uygulanacakt¬r. Ayr¬ca uygulaman¬n maliyetli oldu¼gu du-
rumda rekabetin daha güçlü oldu¼gu gösterilmi¸stir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: telif hakk¬koruma, dijital ürün, korsan kullan¬m¬, Cournot rekabet
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1 Introduction
Digital products possess the distinctive characteristic that they can be copied without losing
much quality. This property makes copy and original close substitutes so that copying activ-
ities have more e¤ect on the demand for the original product compared to the availability of
earlier reproduction methods. Especially with the signicant progress in copying technolo-
gies, of which the most important and widespread one is the internet, digital product piracy
has become the new phenomenon for consumers, policy makers and of course for producers.
Lately, most of the digital product industries are facing a challenge to transform their
distribution mechanisms because of pervasive use of le sharing systems and nearly unpre-
ventable illegal downloadings. Hence producers usually claim that they are su¤ering under
the presence of piracy which reduces their prots signicantly. The recording industry1 sup-
ports this claim as well. There are also empirical papers, like Mckenzie (2009), which claim
on the contrary, that the e¤ect of piracy is insignicant on the sales of the digital retailers.
Keeping in mind the estimates of the results, copyright protection has become a more contro-
versial issue nowadays. Copyright or also known as intellectual property rights are the tools
to give incentives to the producer to continue to create new products by preventing others
to copy without permission of the holder of the intellectual property rights. Hence piracy
has both short run and long run e¤ects on digital product usage. We should emphasize that
this e¤ect, whether it is benecial for the rm and society, depends on the structure of the
market, such as the characteristic that the products possess or the number of rms and their
relative sizes in the market etc.
Moreover, there is also the argument that the holders may prefer some level of piracy due
to the nature of the good. Consider a software program with network e¤ects whose value
for individuals increases with the number people using it Then, the developer may enjoy
some illegal reproduction of the product which will increase the total amount of people using
this particular good. This is also true for information good producers who can promote
their products through copies like in the paper by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004). Since a
remarkable amount of digital products are information goods e.g. music les, copies can be
used to spread information about original products among consumers which will lead them
1IFPIs (the organization that keeps the statistics for record sales) records show that especially for the
years 1999-2005 there is a dramatic fall in record sales
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to identify its true value for themselves or just they can be used as means of advertising.
However, in the analysis of this paper we are going to focus on a homogenous product setting
at which products have neither an externality nor an experimentation property.
The motivation for our paper is di¤erent. We analyze the e¤ect of copyright protection
on the decision process of the rms in di¤erent settings. It has been widely recognized that,
especially in the music industry, the availability of le sharing networks and digital downloads
made entry of small and nancially unsupported artists easier. It is also obvious that a rm
that produces a product that can be illegally reproduced would ask for the protection of
its intellectual property. On the other hand, strong copyright protection will encourage
other potential developers or investors by raising the demand for an original product. If new
entrants can produce a reasonably close substitute to the product of the incumbent, then one
can argue that copyright protection actually lowers entry barriers. Thus, in this paper our
aim is to show that: i) copyright protection, if can be obtained freely, will be fully pursued
by an uncontested monopolist and ii) in the case of a threat of entry, the monopolistic may
no longer pursue full protection. To our knowledge, this last issue has not yet been analyzed.
We have the classical assumptions within this literature that we are going to mention
deeply in following sections; copy is a degraded version of the original, copy users incur
a reproduction cost etc. In section 3.1, we develop a model for a single producer who
will determine the protection level in the rst stage, given that it has decided to develop the
product, and the price in the following stage to maximize its prots. We focus on the optimal
behavior of the monopolist in the existence of piracy rather than focusing on the socially
optimal protection level as in Yoon(2002).This point is the distinguishing characteristic
of our paper such that we allow the producer to determine the protection level which also
determines the demand that he is going to face. Initially we assume that implementing
copyright protection is costless. We show that under this setting the monopolist will choose
a price-protection level pair at which he drives copy users out of the market. It is clear that
since enforcement is costless and prots are increasing with more protection, monopolist will
set the full protection level.
Another objective of this paper, as we mentioned above, is to demonstrate the strategic
interactions between rms in the presence of piracy. For this purpose, in section 3.2 we es-
tablish the optimal outcomes for a two-rm setting. Specically, we characterize the Cournot
Nash equilibria in a duopoly. We assume that the two rms produce exactly the same prod-
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uct and the level of enforcement can be determined only by the incumbent rm. This is not
due to any domination of rm 1 in the industry but is rather based on the structure of the
timing of the decision process. Moreover in the digital product industries marginal costs are
insignicant, in this thesis they are assumed to be equal to zero, and prices are very close
even when products are horizontally quite di¤erentiated. Hence based on our assumption
about the decision process and the nature of the product we use a Cournot competition
model rather than Bertrand or Stackelberg competition. The entrant chooses only its quan-
tity in the second stage given that he decided to enter in the rst stage after he observes the
protection level set by incumbent rm.
Depending on the prot levels in section 3.2, we pursue an answer to the following
question: " Which protection level would the incumbent rm choose in order to maximize
its prots". Obviously, the answer to this question also depends on the distribution of xed
costs which is a key determinant of the entry decision. So in the following section we assume
a particular level of degradation rate  to be able to answer this question and compare
the protection levels we determined in section 3.2. We found that with the threat of a
potential entrant, the incumbent rm will set a protection level that is, for su¢ ciently high
xed cost values, below the level of monopoly case. Full protection is not optimal anymore.
The intuition behind this result is obvious. With more protection, demand for the original
product increases which leads to an increase in the revenues of both rms. Thus the entrant
is more likely to enter the market such that it can cover its xed costs. On the other hand,
the monopolist can prevent entry and make a higher prot than under the Cournot setting.
We showed that for su¢ ciently high xed costs, the best response of the incumbent rm is
to deter entry. As we emphasized before, copying technology in these kind of industries are
highly advanced which reproduces the product with a negligible loss in quality. Therefore we
replicated the analysis with a smaller degradation rate. It turns out that it becomes slightly
harder for incumbent rm to prevent entry with this new value. This is not surprising
however. We will see that the prot functions are decreasing with respect to . To attain
the same demand with the previous analysis, rms should decrease the price level to attract
the consumers on the same valuation level.
In section 3.3.2 we relax the assumption that enforcement of protection is costless. Firms
incur a cost to implement copyright protection in reality. We introduce a cost function and
analyze how the best response of the incumbent rm changes when he carries the burden
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of protection. We nd that, di¤erently from the previous section, for all xed value levels
the optimal behavior of incumbent is to deter entry. This result is quite intuitive as well.
Since choosing a higher protection level is costly, the incumbent monopolist will ask for
less protection, sacricing some of its sales but at the same time making entry less likely.
Piracy turns out to be the means to ght with competitors .At the last section, we state the
concluding remarks and discuss some possible extensions of our model.
Before continuing with the results that we found, we should note that unlike in the
existing literature, we do not discuss the welfare implications of piracy in this thesis. We
mostly focus on the producer side of this issue and analyzed the optimal level of protection
from the perspective of the individual producer.
2 Literature Review
There is a broad range of papers which study the intellectual property rights and mostly
related to digital products in recent years since the e¤ect of piracy has become more apparent
with the availability of sophisticated copying technologies. In this section we are going to
introduce a selection of papers that we think will provide some intuition about our model
either by comparing the di¤erences or emphasizes the common features.
The paper by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2003) provides a useful review of digital product
piracy literature. In this survey they investigate di¤erent models related to the question of
how piracy e¤ect the individual prots and social welfare based on di¤erent product charac-
teristics. In most of the papers they survey, copy and original are vertically di¤erentiated.
For the rst set of the papers, products dont have any network externalities and consumers
are perfectly informed about the good. However the models di¤er from each other based
on the assumptions about the size of industry, design of reproduction cost etc. So we can
compare the results derived in these papers about the e¤ect of piracy on society as a whole
and individual producer under di¤erent market settings. Then they search for the papers
which discuss the indirect appropriability and under what conditions rms can indirectly
appropriates gains from copying. In the following group of papers, the products have net-
work externalities and the third group of articles deal with the problem of piracy when
consumers are not completely informed which is the case of experience goods setting. This
diversication is very helpful to understand the e¤ect of piracy for di¤erent type of products
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adding that the e¤ect for the same type of product but with di¤erent assumptions. Finally
they compare the existing digital products based on the characteristic that they have and
investigates the e¤ect of piracy on the market with these products.
Yoon (2002) is the main paper that we built our model on. He studies the e¤ect of copy-
right protection on social welfare loss and investigates the socially optimal level. Individual
producer is also taken into consideration but the main focus is on society as a whole. He
considers a two stage game with a single producer. First producer decides, under a given
copyright protection level, whether to develop the product or not when he faces a develop-
ment cost of D. This is the stage what he calls "production stage". Then "consumption
stage" follows at which, given reproduction cost and prices, consumers make their decisions
about how to consume the product and producer determines price level concurrently. Each
consumer has three options: they can buy the original product from producer, reproduce it
without authorization or doesnt consume it at all. He considers a continuum of consumer
types whose valuations are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Every type of consumers value
original more than copy which means copy and original are not perfect substitutes. Repro-
duction cost is a function of protection level so that decision of copy use depends directly
on that level along with individual valuations and price level. So far our model coincides
with Yoons paper except we allow producer to determine the protection level additionally
in the rst stage. This new assumption implies in a sense, producer determines the demand
function he is going to face in the second stage. We also added competition to see how the
incumbent rm, here is monopolist, can use copyright protection to maximize his prots.
Additionally we considered a setting where the rm bears the cost of enforcing copyright
protection. Yoon studies two di¤erent e¤ects of copyright protection on the welfare loss
whereas we didnt deal with e¢ ciency problem in our paper. He shows that with an in-
su¢ cient level of protection, prots will decrease due to unauthorized reproductions which
may lead rms not to develop new products, this is underproduction e¤ect. On the other
hand consumer surplus will be higher in a situation where copy use is available. With the
existence of copying opportunity, some of the consumers will decide to copy instead of not to
consume the product and this will increase consumer surplus. Higher copyright protection
will obstruct some of this welfare gain and this is the loss caused by underutilization. He
states that social welfare loss is always decreasing due to underproduction while it can be
either increasing or decreasing due to underutilization. Since prot function of the rm is
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non decreasing with protection level in this setting, the result for underproduction e¤ect is
inevitable. Depending on xed costs, with su¢ ciently high piracy rate, producer may decide
not to develop the product. On the other hand the e¤ect of underutilization depends on the
parameters such as degradation rate and marginal cost of producing the product. The paper
concludes with the analysis of many rms setting. Distinctively from our paper,he doesnt
include any competition. Firms di¤er from their development costs and paper studies the
socially optimal level in this setting context. He shows that optimal protection level for
society depends on the distribution of development costs.
Zhang (2002)s paper is related to our study with competition feature. He constructs his
model on the observation that digital products particularly music has some form of experi-
mentation such that consumption of copies provide information about real characteristic of
the product. He claims that existing distribution mechanism favors "big labels" and it is
ine¢ cient for society in the short run. He considers two producers with horizontally di¤eren-
tiated products located on the Hotelling line, prices are same for both rms and exogenously
given,only a xed number of audience can reach P2P and a proportion of these copy users
will buy original from one of the rms eventually. The di¤erence between big rm and mar-
ginal distributor emerges in the assumption of distribution of information. Big label can
distort consumers perception herewith demand by advertising while marginal artist can not.
Marginal distributors can use peer to peer(P2P) networks to spread information about their
products which makes it easier to enter the market. He shows that introducing P2P tech-
nologies increases total welfare of society due to increase in consumersand marginal rms
surplus meanwhile stars are losing with this network. He also refers to long run e¤ects of
le sharing by which producer may have no longer incentives to create new works due to
insu¢ cient benets. But still he supports the claim that to prevent P2P is not an optimal
solution rather he proposes a new distribution mechanism that he calls "a win win market
for all". Zhangs paper is interesting for us because he also tries to model competition in the
existence of copy use. Moreover we tried to extend Zhangs work by transforming advertis-
ing level to the amount of copy use which was going to be determined endogenously in the
model. But we couldnt manage to deal with the timing problem of decision of copy use and
its advertising e¤ect.
Bae and Choi (2003) also considers a monopolistic rm setting which they analyze in
two di¤erent time span. The short run setup is almost same with Yoons model except the
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assumptions of uniform distribution, instead they use any continuous distribution function,
and marginal cost of production is considered to be zero. They showed that with the exis-
tence of copy users price will be lower than monopoly level which actually leads an increase
in demand for the product. This is important because the presence of unauthorized repro-
ductions is generally assumed to cause a decrease in demand for originals. They separate
reproduction costs into two di¤erent types: one of them is xed and the other depends on
the valuation of individuals. Similarly, we also consider a xed cost of copying which is the
same for everyone and the cost varies among individuals based on their valuations. They
show that in the short run, an increase in the protection level can either decrease or in-
crease social welfare when there are copy users who depend on the reproduction cost which
a¤ected by this change. But it will certainly lead to a decrease in total surplus in the lack
of unauthorized reproductions. The paper concludes by calculating the long run e¤ects of
copy use which is captured by the idea that rms additionally decide on the quality of the
product. Here they nd that in the presence of copy users and under a price regime which
derives copy users out of market, the level of quality supplied will be less than that under
the monopolist setting without piracy. An increase in protection leads to higher quality and
lesser copy use. On the other hand, at a price level at which there will be copy users, the
e¤ect will be either an increase in quality along with a fall in consumption of the original
product, or a decrease in quality but an increase in legal use.
Another paper that studies piracy in the context of information goods is Peitz and Wael-
broeck (2004). This paper investigates the e¤ect of piracy distinctively in a multiproduct
monopoly setting. It is not closely related to our work but still worth mentioning due to
its multiproduct setting. They consider a monopoly which produces N horizontally di¤er-
entiated products in the unit Salop circle. Uniformly distributed consumers can download
the product or buy the original as usual. A copy allows the consumers to know their most
favorite product which will lead to an outward shift in demand. They call this the matching
e¤ect. On the other hand, a copy can be used instead of an original, so copy and original
are competitors in this sense and this e¤ect is called the competition e¤ect in their paper.
Basically copy use can either decrease or increase the rms prot depending on which e¤ect
is dominant. They claim that piracy may actually lead to an increase in prots contrary
to the general acceptance that piracy is harmful for rms. Another remarkable part of this
paper is that the authors study whether piracy can be protable through decreasing the cost
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of promoting the product. Here again, copy plays an informational role so rms can spend
less to inform consumers about their products. In this paper there is no competition between
rms but the idea of using the existence of piracy to increase the prots is somewhat simi-
lar to our model. We investigate how illegal consumption can be used to deter a potential
entrant and make higher prots than a setting where two rms compete.
Belleamme and Picard (2005) study the strategic interaction among rms under the
threat of piracy, too. However, they consider a Bertrand competition model contrary to
our Cournot setting. Moreover, again, our model di¤ers with the feature that one of the
rms, here the incumbent, determines the protection level and hence the demand as well.
In their paper, they compare the price level and total welfare in the Bertrand duopoly with
a multiproduct monopoly setting. They consider two perfectly di¤erentiated information
goods and three types of consumers:buyers, copiers and switchers. They show that demand
for the buyer and copiers are independent while for switchers it is interdependent in a way
that the two goods become complementary because of the increasing return to scale copying
technology. One of the result is that in the monopolistic case it is more protable for rm
to set close prices and target the switchers rather than setting a high and low price and
targeting copiers and buyers separately. On the other hand the pricing strategy in Bertrand
depends on the reproduction cost. For su¢ ciently high level of costs, both rms focus on
switchers and there exists a unique symmetric pure Nash equilibrium. They support the
claim that due to Cournot e¤ect2 the average price set by monopolist is lower than the level
duopolist rms set for this case. However for su¢ ciently low costs there is no pure strategy
equilibrium. Firms will randomize price level and mixed strategy equilibria may exist. They
show that the expected price level is still larger than the price that the multiproduct rm
sets. This paper is parallel with our study in the aspect of studying competition under
the existence of piracy by showing that how the presence of piracy can change the usual
independent demands for goods to interdependency between these products. They conclude
their paper with a welfare analysis and state the comparison between two di¤erent market
structures. In the short run, the monopolistic rm is more e¢ cient while in a dynamic view
the duopoly setting provides more incentive to create new works, so it enhances the social
surplus.
2Since two goods are complemantary, the monopolist can decrease the price of one of the goods and
increase the demand for the other.
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3 Model
First we introduce a setting with a single product monopolistic rm producing a copy-
rightable digital product like a software program or a music le. We will assume that the
good is neither an experience good nor a product with network externality so that we can
eliminate the e¤ect of other users on the maximum willingness to pay of a single consumer
and the role of the copy as a tester to recognize the correct characteristic of the product.
For the rst part, we import the model built by Yoon(2002) but we focus on the optimal
copyright protection level on behalf of the monopolistic rm rather than the socially optimal
level. In other words, we let protection level be a choice variable for monopolistic rm that
he has to decide the prot maximizing level of price and copyright protection level
On the consumer part of the model ,we assume that there is a continuum of consumers
uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1]. To simplify the analysis we also assume that
the maximum willingness to pay or valuation v of consumers are also distributed over the
same interval, so we can identify the set of consumers with their valuations. They have unit
demand, that is they either consume one unit or none. The action set of consumers consists
of three alternatives.
 Consume the original product by purchasing it from producer.
 Consume a copy by borrowing or downloading it.
 Dont consume at all.
We assume that the value of a copy is an (1  ) 2 (0; 1) proportion of original. Thus, a
consumer with valuation v assigns a value v v to the copy. is rate of the degradation in
valuation due to copy use. This feature of the model is based on the nature of most of the
copyrighted materials. Although copy of these products does not deteriorate in quality much,
still original CDs come with booklets that contain song lyrics, DVDs have extra features and
di¤erent language options, plus the audio and video quality is usually noticeably higher. We
will consider that consumers incur a reproduction cost of r which increases with protection
level y that is
@r
@y
> 0. We can interpret this as the protection level increases,the probability
of being detected increases, or the punishment of unauthorized le downloading increases
due to lobbying and legal activities of rms in the market. Moreover in some papers this
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cost is considered as search cost to refer to the fact that we need to spend some time to nd
the material that we want. We assume for a concrete analysis that the relationship between
r and y is perfectly linear that is y = r so for the rest of the paper we denote protection
level and reproduction cost with r. Notice that this is same across the individuals but on
the other hand the total cost of reproduction depends on individual valuations too captured
by the decrease with an amount : So the gross cost of copying varies among consumers.
We also assume for this and following subsections that it is costless to rm to apply more
protection then in Section 3.5 we are going to relax this assumption.
On the production part of the model we assume that the monopolistic rm incurs a xed
cost of F and marginal cost of zero to develop the product3. So total cost of producing
product is F; and 0 if the rm decides not to produce. The monopolist has to make two
di¤erent decisions in two di¤erent stages. First,it decides whether to produce or not and
the protection level to be imposed on market .In the second stage, the monopolist chooses
price level p by taking into consideration the optimal actions chosen by consumers. Fi-
nally,consumers decide their optimal action given the protection level r and price p. By
allowing the monopolist to determine the protection level, we will see that we also let it to
change the form of the demand which depends on the protection level that we are going to
derive in the following section.
3.1 Monopoly Setting
3.1.1 Analysis of optimal protection level and equilibrium outcomes
First we look at the problem faced by a monopolist. Suppose that the rm has developed
the product in the rst stage. Now, the xed cost F is a sunk cost in the second stage. We
introduce the sequence of events as follows. First, the monopolist chooses the protection level
r then in the second round it chooses the optimal price level p given that consumers maxi-
mizes their utilities of the form below, taking into account the reproduction cost determined
3Software or more generally information has noticeable production characteristic in which the production
of the rst copy has a huge sunk cost whereas the second copy costs almost nothing.
(The Economics of Network Industries, Shy, O.)
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in the previous stage.
U =
8>><>>:
v   p original
v   v   r copy
0 no consumption
9>>=>>; (utility func.)
In order to work out the monopolists optimization problem we need to derive the market
demand function. Consumers choose their optimal action given the price and protection level.
The next proposition describes optimal consumer choice at di¤erent price levels.
Proposition 1 If p h r
1  consumers between [0; p) make no consumption and con-
sumers who have valuations between [p; 1] consume the original. If p  r
1  consumers
between

0; r
1 

make no consumption. Consumers between

r
1  ;
p r


make unauthorized
reproduction and consumers whose valuations are between

p r

; 1

buy the original.
Proof. It is obvious that consumers with v   p < 0 and (1  )v   r < 0 will not consume
neither the original nor the copy. The ones with v   p > (1  )v   r will buy the original
and copy the product if the inequality is the other way around.
In the rst case where p h r
1  ; for v 2 [0; p),we have v   p < 0 and v   r1  < 0
which implies (1   )v   r < 0 so there will be no consumption. For v 2 [p; 1], we have
v   p  0 and v   p > v   r
1  since p <
r
1  : If we multiple both sides with (1  ) we get
(1  ) (v   p) > (1  ) v   r and v   p > (1  ) (v   p) since 0 < (1  ) < 1:So there
is no copy consumption, consumers buy the original .The argument is similar for the second
case so we skip it here.
>From proposition 1 we can derive the demand function as
D(p) =
8<: 1  p if p <
r
1  
1  p  r

if p  r
1  
9=; (demand function)
Remark 1 It is useful to assume that 0  r +   1 .Suppose 1 > r +  then we have
v > v (r + ) for all v and v > r + v since v 2 [0; 1] which implies that v (1  )  r < 0.
Without this assumption there would be no copy users which is not an interesting case.
Note that the position of the kink in the demand curve depends on the value of r. Now
we can dene equilibrium outcomes for di¤erent levels of copyright protection.
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Proposition 2 i)For the case 0  r  (1  )
1 + 
we have equilibrium outcomes as
p = +r
2
and q = +r
2
and corresponding prot is m1 =
(+r)2
4
ii)For the case
(1  )
1 + 
< r  1  
2
the equilibrium outcomes are
p = r
1  and q = 1  r1  and the corresponding prot is m2 = ( r1 )(1  r1 )
iii)For the case 1 
2
< r < 1   equilibrium outcomes are
p = 1
2
; q = 1
2
and m3 =
1
4
Proof.
 Constrained prot maximization problem for p  r
1   is maxp (1 
p r

)p subject to
p  r
1   . From rst order (FOC) and complementary slackness(CS) conditions we
have
1  2p  r

+  = 0!  = 2p  r

  1 (FOC and CS)
(p  r
1  ) = 0
combining FOC and CS conditions, two critical points are p1 =
 + r
2
; and p2 =
r
1   .The rst one is the unconstrained maximizer of the problem the second one is
the minimum price that satises the constraint. So for the rst price to satisfy the
constraint the following must be true.
p1 
r
1  
 + r
2
 r
1   (1)
r  (1  )
(1 + )
We also need to compare the prots for these two prices to nd the optimal level. After
we evaluated p1 and p

2 in the prot function (1   p r )p,we see that (p1) =
( + r)2
4

(p2) =
r(1    r)
(1  )2 for the r values that satises the contsraint. So p

1 is the optimal
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level. The corresponding quantity level is q =
 + r
2
and prot is  =
( + r)2
4
.We should
note that for this case the amount of copy users is
  r
2
  r
1   .
 Price level p1 is increasing along with the protection level r until it reaches critical
value of r that satises the (1).Meanwhile, the number of copy users decreases. At
the point where the constraint binds ,p1 and p

2 are equal. With r >
(1  )
(1 + )
, the
optimal price becomes p2 and there are no copy users.(1) continues to bind for r 
1  
2
.Passing that threshold we switch to the other part of the demand function which
will be shown below.
 For p < r
1   , the problem is maxp (1   p)p and from FOC of 1   2p = 0 we have ,
p3 =
1
2
.Again for this price to satisfy p <
r
1   ,the following must be true
1
2
< r
1 
r > 1 
2
(2)
>From the demand function above, it is straightforward to see that the optimal quantity
and prot levels are stated as in the proposition.
.
Remark 2 For the rst case, prot is an increasing function of r. For the second case, with
(1 )
1+
< r  1 
2
, prot also increases with r, that is @
@r
 0. If we evaluate the maximum
prot at maximum attainable protection level for the rst case in the proposition above,
the prot level is 
(1+)2
For the second case, we have maximum prot of 1
4
. 1
4
 
(1+)2
for
 < 1.
Proposition 3 In the rst stage the producer will develop the product for F < 1
4
and
choose any protection level of r 2  1 
2
; 1  
If F  1
4
the producer will not develop the product for any r level
Proof. Proof is straightforward from discussion above. We have demonstrated that the
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maximum prot level which monopolist can achieve is 1
4
:It wont develop product for the F
values greater than this level since it will not over the xed cost obtained in the rst stage.
On the other hand for F < 1
4
,by imposing a protection level r 2  1 
2
; 1   ,it will attain
positive prots which leads the decision of to produce the product.
Since prots is an increasing function of copyright protection level under the given inter-
vals above and enforcement cost is zero, monopolist will choose the protection level at which
its prots is the maximum. This means that with a protection level r 2  1 
2
; 1   ,he
can make a prot of 1
4
which we showed in the second remark, is bigger than other prot
level. For this level of protection, notice that there are no copy users. So producers optimal
response is to apply full protection which means to derive copies out of the market.
3.2 Duopoly Setting
3.2.1 Analysis of optimal protection level and equilibrium outcomes
In this section we want to analyze the optimal choices taken by the monopolistic rm in the
existence of a threat of entry. We now introduce an entrant (rm 2) with the same xed
cost of F and a marginal cost of 0. The products are homogenous and we assume that only
the incumbent rm (rm 1) can determine the protection level. The reasoning is that the
incumbent monopolist has been active for a longer period in the market plus the fact that
entry has not been realized yet. We do not model this situation as a dynamic game however.
Here again the cost of applying copyright protection is considered to be zero. The sequence
of events is as follows. We are going to denote the incumbent as rm 1, and the entrant as
rm 2.
 In the rst stage, given that rm 1 already decided to create the product, rm 2
decides whether to develop the product or not and rm 1 determines the protection
level concurrently.
 In the second stage, rms decide how much to produce by taking into account con-
sumersoptimal choices given the price level and the reproduction cost.
Again, consumers have three options. To purchase the original product from one of the
rms, to obtain a copy, or not to consume. If both rms decide to develop the product, the
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game takes the form of simple Cournot competition with equal marginal costs. In the second
stage,we can rewrite the demand function as an "inverse demand function" as follows:
D(Q) =
(
1 Q when q1 + q2 > 1  r1 
 + r   Q when q1 + q2 > 1  r1 
)
(Inv.demand.Func)
The demand function and the derivation of the second stage (quantity competition)
equilibrium are similar to the monopoly case. We derive the optimal price, the quantity
level and the corresponding prots in the proposition below.
Proposition 4 i)For 0  r   (1  )
2 + 
the equilibrium outcomes are
p =
 + r
3
; q1 = q2 =
 + r
3
1 = 2 =
( + r)2
9
ii)For
 (1  )
2 + 
< r  1  
3
the equilibrium outcomes are
p = r
1  ; q
1 = q2 = 1
2
r
1  
1 = 2 = 1
2
( r
1 )(1  r1 )
iii) For
1  
3
< r < 1   the equilibrium outcomes are
p = 1
3
; q1 = q2 = 1
3
and 1 = 2 = 1
9
Proof. This is nothing but a constrained maximization problem in a Cournot setting. Let
rst derive the optimal outcomes for the second part of the demand function. Hence the
maximization problem for rm 1 becomes
max
q1
( + r   (q1 + q2))q1
and for rm 2 it is
max
q2
( + r   (q1 + q2))q2
subject to same constraint q1 + q2  1   r1  . Best response functions for non-binding
optimization are:
 + r   q2
2
= q1 (BR11)
 + r   q1
2
= q2 (BR12)
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The Nash equilibrium outcomes are q1 = q2 =
 + r
3
. To satisfy the constraint q1 + q2 
1  r
1  ; the following must be true.
2:
 + r
3
 1  r
1  
2r
3
+
r
1   
2
3
r   (1  )
2 + 
Similarly for the case that constraint binds, the optimal total quantity level is Q = 1  r
1 
and the best response functions are
q1 = 1  r
1     q2 (BR
2
1)
q2 = 1  r
1     q1 (BR
2
2)
To simplify analysis we will only consider the symmetric Nash equilibrium of this game,
that is q1 = q2 = 12
r
1  :These quantity levels are going to be optimal until r reaches
the value
1  
3
. After that threshold demand changes as stated in the rst part of the
Inv.demand.Func. For that case rmsproblems become
max
q1
(1  q1   q2)q1 for the rst rm
max
q2
(1  q1   q2)q2 for second rm
Best response functions are as follows:
q1 =
1  q2
2
(BR31)
q2 =
1  q1
2
(BR32)
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Optimal outcomes are q1 = q2 = 1
3
: Again it can easily be shown that
1  
3
< r must be
true to satisfy the constraint q1 + q2 > 1   r1  . For the values the inequality is other way
around, demand function switches to the second part in Inv.demand.Func.
The derivation of optimal outcomes follows a similar path with the monopolistic case
in the sense of the constraint maximization. Of course in that setting rms have to act
strategically and determine the quantity they will produce rather than enforcing a price
level.
Remark 3 For the rst case, prot is an increasing function of r and for the second case
with (1 )
2+
< r  1 
3
, prot also increases with r that is @
@r
 0. If we evaluate prot at
the maximum attainable protection level for the rst case in the proposition it will be 
(2+)2
,
and this is smaller than 1
9
for  2 (0; 1). In second case for r = 1 
3
prot level is again 1
9
:
We should once emphasize that prots are increasing with protection level for duopoly
setting as well. After deriving optimal choices for a specic optimal protection level, we
want to analyze how the incumbent rm will react to the possibility of competition. But its
response depends on the distribution of the xed cost, F . For any xed cost level F  1
9
,
there will be no entry. We can see that the most protable situation for the entrant is the
third case in the proposition below in which its prot is at most 1
9
. Obviously, the entrant
prefers a higher level copyright protection as this increases the demand for its product and
the entrant does not have to pay for it. On the other hand for incumbent rm there will be
a trade o¤ between implementing high or a low protection level. Imposing a high protection
level has two contrary e¤ects. As we stated above, prots increase with protection level but
on the other hand with this increased prots it is easier for rm 2 to cover its xed cost
which leads it to enter the market. Hence the optimal strategy for incumbent is ambiguous.
Actually it depends on the xed cost levels and the  level. We are going to pursue the
optimal behavior of rm 1 for a given degradation rate in the following section.
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3.3 Analysis of Optimal Protection With Competition: A Numer-
ical Example
In the rst section of the model, we tried to construct a framework for the optimal outcomes
of the rm in a monopolistic setting. Next, we added competition to this setting and analyzed
how rms react to this competition and how the incumbent rm will use the protection level
as a tool to deter entry. It turns out that without any further restrictions the model is
too involved to solve for the optimal choice of the protection level by the incumbent rm.
Remember that the choice of protection level changes the shape of the demand curve and
hence rm prots are highly non-linear functions of it. Furthermore, the xed cost of entry
will determine whether we have a monopoly or an oligopoly setting. To simplify the analysis
we need to impose a specic alpha () level to nd the critical protection level to deter entry
and try to compare it with the monopolistic case.
Let us dene and calculate the critical values of the protection level at which the demand
functions have a kink. Observe that these values di¤er among monopolistic and Cournot
case since the optimal price levels that should satisfy the condition p <
r
1   or p 
r
1  
are di¤erent.
Here, rst we assume that  = 0:25 .For this  value the corresponding protection and
prot level values for each case are as follows:
rm1 =
(1  )
1 + 
= 0:15 Critical protection level in the rst case of monopoly setting.
rm2 =
(1  )
2
= 0:375 Critical protection level in the second case of monopoly setting.
rc1 =
(1  )
2 + 
= 0:083 Critical protection level in the rst case of duopoly setting
rc2 =
(1  )
3
= 0:25 Critical protection level in the second case of duopoly setting
m1 = 4(0:125 +
r
2
)2 Optimal monopoly prot of rm 1 for rst case
m2 =  1:78r(r   0:75) Optimal monopoly prot of rm 1 for the second case
m3 =
1
4
Optimal Cournot prot of both rms in the rst case
c11 = 
c2
1 = 0:44(0:25 + r)
2 Optimal Cournot prot of both rms in the rst case
c12 = 
c2
2 =  0:89(r   0:75)2 Optimal Cournot prot of both rms in the second case
c12 = 
c2
2 =
1
9
Optimal Cournot prot level of both rms in the third case
Now the problem of the incumbent rm is reduced to comparing the prots in each
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case where entry occurs and the prots without entry. We still assume that implementing
protection is costless for the incumbent rm
Proposition 5 i) For xed cost values less than 0:027 there is no protection level that rm
1 can choose to deter entry
ii) For F 2 [0:027; 0:049] rm 1 can deter entry by implementing rmax1 but ne1 < 19 so
it prefers rm 2 to enter the market and share a prot level of 1
9
iii) For F 2 (0:049; 0:08] rm 1 will deter entry by implementing rmax2 and make a
prot of ne2 which is greater than
1
9
iv) For F 2 (0:08; 1
9
) rm 1 will deter entry by implementing rmax2 and make a prot of
2F which is greater than 1
9
v) For F  1
9
rm 2 prefers not to enter the market. So rm 1 will choose r 2 
1 
2
; 1   Which is the most protable choice for monopolistic setting.
.
Proof. Starting from the lowest level of protection, for r  [0; 0:083], in order to deter entry
and maximize its prots, rm 1 s problem will look as follows:
max
r
m1 subject to 
c2
1  F
Since the optimal monopoly prot for this case is m1 = 4(0:125 +
r
2
)2 and
@m1
@r
> 0,the
constraint c11  F will bind and we can nd the maximum protection level that deters entry
as rmax1 =  0:25 + 1:5pF . This is the protection level which does not allow rm 2 to enter
the market for a given F . For this protection level to satisfy the condition that r belongs
to [0; 0:083], F should be in the interval [0:027; 0:049] and the prot level in the absence of
entry is ne1 = 2:25F for this case. Even for the maximum F within this interval, namely
0:049, rm 1s prot will be equal to 1
9
:
For the case of r (0:083; 0:15], the demand function is as in the rst case in Inv.demand.Func
.The prot function takes the form of m1 in case rm 1 does not allow entry whereas it will
be c12 = 
c2
2 =  0:89(r   0:75)2 if entry occurs. So the objective function of rm 1 is
max
r
m1 subject to 
c2
2  F
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Again, since prot level m1 is an increasing function with respect to r, and
@c22
@r
> 0
for the interval given above , the constraint c22  F will be binding. Then, the maximum
protection level that can be imposed to deter entry is rmax2 = 0:375   0:375pF :This is the
maximum attainable protection level while entry is prevented. To satisfy the condition that
r (0:083; 0:15] ,F should be in the interval. (0:049; 0:08]. The prot of rm 1 in this case
becomes ne2 =  0:14(
p
1  8F   1:67)2 and for the range F 2 (0; 0:125) it is an increasing
function with respect to F . Additionally, for values of F 2 [0:049;1) prot level ne2 is
greater or equal than 1
9
which implies that for F 2 (0:049; 0:08], ne2  19 too.
For r (0:15; 0:25], the prot for the monopoly case is m2 =  1:78r(r   0:75) and for
the Cournot case it is c22 =  0:89(r   0:75)2 We should emphasize that m2 = 2c22 . The
objective of rm 1 is
max
r
m2 subject to 
c2
2  F
We should also note that the prot functions m2 and 
c2
2 attain their maxima at
1  
2
and
particularly at 0:375 for  = 0:25:So this means
@m2
@r
> 0 and
@c22
@r
> 0 for the given interval
above. This implies that the constraint binds, which means c22 = F . If rm 1 deters entry
by choosing rmax2 = 0:375   0:375p1  8F , it makes a prot of 2F . Only for F 2 (0:08; 1
9
]
we are able to choose rmax2 to deter entry and stay on the same demand function. For these
F values, 2F is always greater than 1
9
.
>From discussion above, we can reach the proposition stated below.
Observe that the response of rm 1 to the entry threat depends on the distribution of
the xed cost of F: For low values of F it is not protable to deter entry as we can see from
the discussion above. Indeed for values less than 0:027, rm 1 can not deter entry at all. The
only case that it will accommodate with entry is the second one which rm 2 has relatively
low xed cost. Notice that rm 1 can deter entry by setting rmax1 but remember also for
this level of protection , the demand function takes the form like in the rst part??.So for
this case there are copy users in the market which decreases demand of both rms already
and leads lower prots. Alternatively incumbent may set a protection level r 2  1 
3
; 1  
such that rm 2 enters the market and they share demand equally and each makes a prot
of 1
9
:We showed that for  = 0:25 and F 2 [0:027; 0:049) ,accommodating is more protable.
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It is obvious that if rm 1 decides not to block entry, it will choose the protection level at
which prots are maximum for duopoly setting, particularly r 2  1 
3
; 1  .
We should also note that each optimal protection level under the threat of entry is smaller
for all values of F but not less than 0:049 contrast to the monopoly setting. The intuition
behind this can be explained with the fact that :incumbent rm can use protection level as
a mechanism to change the demand function by allowing more copy users to the market.
This will lead a decrease in demand for potential entrant and for rm 1 as well. But still
prots by deterring will be greater than accommodate for xed costs bigger than 0:049:
In the following section we are going to analyze the optimal choices with a lower degra-
dation rate.
3.3.1 A Comparative Analysis
In this section we replicate the previous analysis with a di¤erent degradation level to see how
rms will react to this new parameter value. Since, as we mentioned before, digital products
and their copies are close substitutes by using sophisticated reproduction technologies, we are
going to assume that  = 0:1 to be consistent with this fact and analyze the optimal solutions
in contrast to  = 0:25: This means that copy and original are now closer substitutes and
piracy is a more serious threat compared to the previous analysis. Now incumbent rm has
to set a lower price to drive all the copy users out of the market which corresponds to the
rst part of theInv.demand.Func. On the other hand it will be easier to deter entry even
for low xed cost values since this new cost structure reduces the prot of both rms. We
are going to see that incumbent will have the chance to prevent entry for small F values at
which it didnt have before. Moreover it will accommodate with entry for some xed cost
levels at which it was more protable to block it previously. First let us to introduce the
corresponding protection and prot levels for  = 0:1:
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rm1 =
(1  )
1 + 
= 0:082 Critical protection level in the rst case of monopoly setting.
rm2 =
(1  )
2
= 0:45 Critical protection level in the second case of monopoly setting.
rc1 =
(1  )
2 + 
= 0:043 Critical protection level in the rst case of duopoly setting.
rc2 =
(1  )
3
= 0:3 Critical protection level in the second case of duopoly setting.
m1 = 10(0:5 +
r
2
)2 Optimal monopoly prot of rm 1 for rst case
m2 =  1:234r(r   0:9) Optimal monopoly prot of rm 1 for the second case
m3 =
1
4
Optimal monopoly prot of rm1 for the third case
c11 = 
c2
1 = 1:1(0:1 + r)
2 Optimal Cournot prot of both rms in the rst case
c12 = 
c2
2 =  0:617(r   0:9)2 Optimal Cournot prot of both rms in the second case
c12 = 
c2
2 =
1
9
Optimal Cournot prot level of both rms in the third case
Notice that the price level that should be set to drive the copiers out of the market is
smaller now. Particularly it should be less than rm1 = 0:082 for monopolistic case and less
than rc1 = 0:043 for Cournot competition while the corresponding levels were 0:15 and 0:083
in the previous analysis. So prot levels for each case will be smaller.
Proposition 6 i) For xed cost values less than 0:011 there is no protection level that rm
1 can choose to deter entry.
ii) For F 2 [0:011; 0:023] rm 1 will accommodate with entry.
iii) For F 2 (0:023; 0:041) rm 1 will accommodate with entry.
iv) For F 2 (0:041; 0:055) rm 1 will accommodate with entry
For F 2 0:055; 1
9

rm 1 will deter entry by setting rmax2 = 0:45  0:45p1  8F
v) For F  1
9
rm 2 prefers not to enter the market. So rm 1 will choose r 2 
1 
2
; 1   Which is the most protable choice for monopolistic setting
Proof. With a similar argument in the previous section, here we skip all the derivations
done there, the result will be as follows: By decreasing the degradation value , the cost of
reproduction also decreases in an amount depending on individual valuations. But we should
note that the cost is smaller for every consumer type in contrast to  = 0:25. In proposition
6 we depict the di¤erence between proposition 5 such that with a smaller , we have the
opportunity to deter entry for small values that we could not before. The intuition is quite
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obvious. Since copy is a closer substitute, rms have to set prices lower than the previous
setting to attract consumers who buy original before and can switch to copying now. This
will lead a decrease in the prots and make easier to deter entry. For F 2 [0:011; 0:023]
rm 1 can prevent entry and make a prot of 0:051 which is less than 1
9
so to accommodate
will be optimal strategy. For the case F 2 (0:023; 0:041) the blocking prot level will be
0:51(
p
1  8F   1:22)2 which is smaller than 1
9
for F 2 (0; 0:125) which also includes our
interval of xed cost. So again it is optimal to let rm 2 to enter the market. The same
reasoning is true for the values of F 2 (0:041; 0:055).However for F 2 0:055; 1
9

, whenever
incumbent deter entry it will make a prot of 2F which is greater than 1
9
for this range of
xed values. Finally for any F  1
9
rm 2 will not enter to the market at any protection
level therefore incumbent will maximize its prot by choosing r 2  1 
2
; 1   like it does
as a monopolist.
3.3.2 Analysis of optimal protection level with enforcement cost
In the previous sections, we assumed that implementing protection is costless for the incum-
bent rm. But in reality rms incur a cost to impose copyright protection on their products.
This cost can consist of expenses due to lawsuits 4 against illegal activities or to persuade
policy makers to take actions against piracy which will be more agresive. Especially for digi-
tal products this cost can be attained by imposing di¤erent mechanisms to the product itself.
Then copying will be impossible or more costly for the consumer.5. So far we assumed that
only incumbent rm can determine protection level hence he also bears all the enforcement
costs.
For this section we will assume that the incumbent rm incurs a total cost of TC = c: r
2
2
to impose protection level r .This is an increasing convex function which captures the idea
that to be able to increase the protection level for high values of r, we have to bear more
cost contrast to the case of low values.
To be able to compare results we found in the previous sections, we are going to analyze
our problem by assuming a specic value for c such that c = 0:5. The prots of the
4One of the most famous lawsuits is the Napster case in which the peer-to-peer le sharing platform lost
against the record label in 2000.
5some softwares include a a web based funciton to prevent illegal users to function the program online
(Bae and Choi )
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entrant will not change since the party that implement protection is the incumbent rm.
The formulation of rm 1s problem is same except the changes in prots. Since the prots
of the entrant remain unchanged, the constraints on which incumbent rm will maximize its
prots are same as in the previous section.
Proposition 7 With enforcement costs, for every possible value of F in the interval

0:027; 1
9

,
rm 1 will deter entry
Proof. The problem can be formulated as follows,
i) For the case F 2 [0:027; 0:049] rm 1 tries to maximize its prot in case of blocking
entry such that
max
r
(r + 0:25)2   0:25r2
subject toc21  F
Since @
mb
@r
> 0 , as we emphasized above that constraints are same, the maximum
protection level that rm 1 will implement to prevent entry remains same too that is rmax1 =
 0:25 + 1:5pF : After we substitute this value in (r + 0:25)2   0:25r2 for r, we obtain the
monopoly prot level in case of blocking the entry which is MB1 = 1:68F +0:187
p
F  0:015:
If it does not deter entry than the prot level will be ce1 = 0:44(0:25 + r)
2  0:25r2: Cournot
prot is increasing with protection level. So incumbent rm will prefer to set the maximum
protection level for Cournot case at which we stay in the rst part of the demand function
which is 0:083 for this case. The prot level evaluated at this value is ce0:083 = 0:047.
For F values between (0:021;1) ,MB1 > ce0:083 = 0:047 which also contains our interval
F 2 [0:027; 0:049] :
ii) For the case F 2 (0:049; 0:08) rm 1s problem can be states as
max
r
(r + 0:25)2   0:25r2
subject to
c22 =  0:89(r   0:75)2  F
Now for this case the maximum protection level to deter entry is rmax2 = 0:375 0:375pF :
Again after we substitute this value in prot function (r+0:25)2 0:25r2; we obtain monopoly
prot level of MB2 = 0:461  0:4
p
1  8F   0:844F . If it does not deter entry then he will
get the prot level of ce2 =  0:89(r   0:75)2   0:25r2. This prot function is increasing for
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the r values smaller than 0:29. This implies that incumbent rm will choose the maximum
protection level at which we stay in the same part of the demand function. In this case it is
0:25:The prot level evaluated at this protection level is ce0:25 = 0:09: For F values between
(0:015; 0:125) , MB2 > 
ce
2 which also contains our interval F 2 (0:049; 0:08).
iii) In the case F 2 [0:08; 1
9
] we deal with the problem of rm 1which takes the form of
max
r
  1:78r(r   0:75)  0:25r2
subject to
c22 =  0:89(r   0:75)2  F
To deter entry rm 1 can choose rmax2 = 0:375   0:375pF and the prot evaluated at this
protection level is MB3 =  0:07 + 2:28F + 0:07
p
1  8F : Again the non block prot level
is ce2 =  0:89(r   0:75)2   0:25r2 and its maximum value is ce0:25 = 0:09:We found that for
F 2 [0:08; 1
9
] , MB3 > 
ce
0:25 .
We established in the previous section that for high values of protection level, rm 2 is
more likely to enter market due to an increase in the demand for original products. Only
for relatively low values of the xed cost will rm 1 accommodate entry. In this section we
reached the result that by adding a cost to implement protection, even for low values of F ,
the incumbent rm will choose to block entry. Competition is stronger now. For this case it
is not protable anymore to allow entry by choosing r 2  1 
3
; 1  .It is obvious that due
to the implementation cost the prot level will be less than 1
9
, hence to choose less protection
and deter entry is more protable even for low xed costs.
4 Conclusion
This thesis studies how optimal copyright protection level against digital product piracy
changes when there is competition in the market and when there is an copyright implemen-
tation cost for a single producer. The basic di¤erence between the thesis and existing papers
in the literature is that we identied the incumbent rm as being the party that determines
the protection level. This makes the choice of protection an endogenous decision variable
and a means to deter entry.
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First we showed that the monopolist pursue full protection without any potential entrant
and no enforcement cost. This is the outcome at which there are no copy users in the market.
Next, to be able to make a concrete analysis, we had to assume a specic value for the degra-
dation level. Since copy of digital products does not lose much quality, we believe that 0:25
is a plausible value for this specication. Under this assumption, we found that for relatively
high xed costs to deter entry, the incumbent rm will enjoy some piracy in the market. This
means that it will choose a level below full protection. Then we made a comparative analysis
by assuming a lower value for degradation rate which is 0:1. Considering the improvements
in copying technologies, this assumption will be more meaningful. Although the original of
a digital product usually has some extra features, consumer help after purchase for example,
copies become more closer in quality to the original product. We established that in this
case it will be harder to deter entry. Piracy becomes more dangerous for both rms. The
prot levels will be lower, and for the incumbent preventing entry will be benecial only
for relatively higher xed costs of entry. Furthermore, by relaxing the assumption we made
earlier that implementation of protection is costless, we established that even for low xed
costs, to deter entry will be protable for the incumbent rm in the case where  is 0:25:
The results in this paper suggest that in the presence of competition, existing rms would
prefer some level of piracy in the market to strengthen the entry barriers even if they have
to sacrice some proportion of their prots. However if piracy becomes more e¤ective in the
market, then they would prefer to deter entry only for a slightly higher xed cost level.
In this thesis, we try to model the e¤ect of piracy on the individual producers with
perfectly homogenous products where one of the rms decides on the protection level in
the market which also determines the demand that is going to be faced. The analysis
could be extended to a heterogenous products setting as well. Here copies can be used
to transmit information about the original or without any information good setting rms
promote their products through copies which is very common in music industry in reality. In
both cases copies have an advertising e¤ect. Zhang(2004) and Peitz and Waelbroeck built a
framework with a similar purpose. However, in Zhangs paper the proportion of copy users
is exogenously given, where the latter paper distinguishes the analysis where either everyone
copies or there is no copy use at all. Moreover, they investigate the case of the multiproduct
monopoly rather than competition. It is possible to pursue a framework such that the choice
variables for the incumbent rm are copyright protection level and advertisement level. In
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this framework, the incumbent rm would choose an advertising level, facing an convex
cost function, to inform the consumers about the availability of its product in the market
whereas entrant doesnt have any budget to advertise its own product. The only way for
rm 2 to transmit information is through the copy users. So again in this framework , the
amount of copy users is endogenously determined like in our present model and the copy
users spread the information about the product. Hence they create a P2P e¤ect. With higher
protection level the incumbent rm can increase its revenues but then has to spend more
on advertisement which reduces its prots. The optimal level will depend on which e¤ect is
dominant. We tried to extend the present model in this direction but encountered di¢ culties
in establishing the right timing structure. Since the P2P e¤ect on the consumption of these
kind of products is important, an advertisement feature still deserves attention and is left
for future research.
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